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Petitioner, Harley Davidson of Northern Utah submits this opening brief in appeal 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ..., 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction[.]"2 This is an appeal from the final judgment 
of the Workforce Appeals Board for the Department of Workforce Services, and although 
it has original appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provide that the 
Supreme Court may transfer any matter over which it has original appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the decision of the Workforce Board of Appeals that Respondent was 
wrongfully terminated was incorrect. 
2. Whether Petitioner actually had just cause to terminate Respondent's 
employment. 
3. Whether Respondent should be entitled to an award of unemployment benefits 
when she had been terminated for just cause. 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
2
 Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)0) (1953, as amended). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A decision of the Workforce Appeals Board should be reviewed to determine if it is 
reasonable and rational in it's application of the law and the facts. See Johnson v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Utah Administrative Code R994-405-201. Discharge - General Definition. 
A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in 
determining the date the employment ended. Benefits shall be denied if the 
claimant was discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in connection 
with employment, not constituting a crime, which was deliberate, willful, or 
wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest. However, not every 
legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial of benefits. A just cause 
discharge must include some fault on the part of the worker. A reduction of 
force is considered a discharge without just cause at the convenience of the 
employer. 
Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements 
must be satisfied: 
(1) Culpability. 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If 
the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no 
expectation that it would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be 
shown. The claimant's prior work record is an important factor in determining 
whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good faith error in 
judgment. A long term employee with an established pattern of complying 
with the employer's rules may not demonstrate by a single violation, even 
though harmful, that the infraction would be repeated. In this instance, 
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depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be necessary for the 
employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The worker must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected. 
There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the 
employer; however, it must be shown that the worker should have been able 
to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not 
be established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected 
behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a 
universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the 
worker had knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the worker 
should have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. 
If the employer had a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time 
of the separation, it generally must have been followed for knowledge to be 
established, except in the case of very severe infractions, including criminal 
actions. 
(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are 
not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued 
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of 
a reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of 
control if the claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may be 
necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. 
While such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not 
mean benefits will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases 
involving a discharge due to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be 
shown that the claimant had the ability to perform the job duties in a 
satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a good faith effort to 
meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill or ability 
and a discharge results, just cause is not established. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
Petitioner initiated this matter in dispute of an award of employment benefits for 
Respondent, a former employee. Petitioner terminated Respondent's employment after 
having been warned several times to perform in a certain manner and she directly and 
knowingly disregarded those warnings. Thereafter, Respondent applied for unemployment 
benefits, which Petitioner disputed. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
Respondent filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits on August 4, 2003. 
See Court Record (hereinafter "Rec") p. 1-2. 
On August 25,2003, said claim for unemployment benefits was denied. See Rec. P. 
11. 
Respondent appealed the decision to Workforce Services Appeals Section, August 
29,2003. See Rec. P. 12. 
On September 25, 2003, the parties participated in an unemployment appeal 
telephonic hearing. See transcript of hearing, Rec. PP. 16-64. 
September 26, 2003, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision granting 
unemployment benefits. See Rec. P. 65-67. 
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October 23,2003, Petitioner filed it's appeal of the decision awarding unemployment 
benefits to the Workforce Appeals Board. See Rec. P. 68-70. Respondent opposed said 
appeal by letter on November 7, 2003. See Rec. P. 72. 
December 4, 2003, the Workforce Appeals Board confirmed the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge granting unemployment benefits to the Respondent. See Rec. P. 
80-84. 
Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration on December 17,2003 (See Rec. P. 85-
87), which was denied on January 7, 2004. See Rec. P. 89-91. 
Petitioner appealed this matter to this Court. See Rec. P. 96-97. 
Facts established in the Record below: 
1. Respondent, Ms. Brandi Mason, was an employee for Petitioner for almost two 
years. See Rec. P. 2-3. 
2. On several occasions during those two years, Ms. Mason was reprimanded for 
failing to properly clock in or out. See Rec. P. 3, 7, 29-30, 40-41, 46, 50. 
3. On July 23, 2005, a day in which she was not working, Ms. Mason requested 
another employee, who was working on that day, to clock her in. Ms. Mason testified that 
the purpose for having her co-employee clock her in on a day she was not working was to 
correct her failure to clock in on a previous day. See Rec. P. 49. 
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4. Mr. Timmons, the owner of the business, on several occasions reprimanded 
Ms. Mason for her failure to clock in and out, and ultimately had her promise she would not 
repeat that again. See Rec. P. 29-30, 40-41, 46, 50. 
5. On July 25, 2003, the next day Ms. Mason worked, she was fired because she 
had another employee clock her in on a day in which she was not working, and as a result 
of a culmination of several years of abuse of the employer's policies. See Id. 
6. Ms. Mason testified during the telephonic appeals hearing that her supervisor, 
someone down the chain of command from Mr. Timmons, but above Ms. Mason, had 
authorized Ms. Mason to have another employee clock her in during a day in which she did 
not work. See Rec. P. 50. 
7. The supervisor testified that she had not given that authorization. She further 
testified that she was not aware of the promise Ms. Mason had made to Mr. Timmons to 
clock in and out according to company procedures. See Rec. P. 39. 
8. Ms. Mason did not speak with Mr. Timmons, the owner, and the one to whom 
she had made her promise, after she had forgotten to clock in and out, rather, she went 
behind his back to another supervisor where she claims she received authorization. See Rec. 
P. 54, 49-50. 
9. Mr. Timmons indicated that Ms. Mason knew, through several verbal 
warnings that her behavior was unacceptable, when she continued to do it, her employment 
was terminated. See Rec. P. 47. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Petitioner, the employer, terminated Respondent's employment after having 
directly failed to keep her promise to clock in and out at appropriate times while at work. 
She further convinced another employee to clock her in on a day she was not at work. The 
employee's actions indicate that she was culpable, had the requisite knowledge, and control 
required to justify a termination for just cause. The decision of the ALJ that Ms. Mason's 
termination was wrongful was incorrect and should be reversed. 
2. Having just cause to terminate Ms. Mason, she should be denied recovery of 
any unemployment benefits from the Petitioner. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Respondent Was Terminated for Just Cause. 
Ms. Mason (the "Respondent" or the "employee") was repeatedly told that she must 
clock in when she arrived to work and clock out when she left. The employee was 
repeatedly told this because she failed to clock in or clock out on several occasions. She was 
the single worst offender of the failure to properly clock in for her work shift. The 
employee, after having been reprimanded on the issue, promised her employer/owner that 
she would correct this behavior, but did not. On July 21, 2003, the employee again failed 
to clock in as required by the employer/owner as she promised she would do. The employee 
directly disobeyed specific requirements given by the employer/owner and broke her 
promise to not let it happen again. This in and of itself is just cause for termination. 
Additionally, however, she had another employee clock her in on July 23,2003, a day when 
she admittedly did not work. This also is just cause for termination. 
The ALJ found that, the employee was told by a supervisor that she could have 
another employee clock her in on a day she was not at work. However, she did not advise 
the supervisor of her promise to the owner/employer when she got this permission from the 
supervisor. This was in direct contradiction to the requirements of the owner/employer and 
the promises made by the employee to correct her behavior. While the employee knew of 
the discussions and warnings she had received with and from the employer., like a child who 
when he asks his father if he can do something and is told no and later goes to his mother, 
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fully knowing that his father had already told him no, the employee went to a supervisor for 
permission to break a promise the supervisor had no knowledge of. The employee did this 
without ever disclosing the promise she had made to the employer. This also constitutes 
insubordination and grounds for discharge. She failed to inform the supervisor at the time 
she made her request, of the owner/employer's demand that the behavior stop, and further 
failed to inform the supervisor of her promise to never repeat the action again. The 
supervisor had no knowledge of the promise Ms. Mason had made to the owner/employer. 
The employee knew this was not acceptable behavior for the employer, nevertheless she 
went directly behind his back and attempted to sneak approval from the supervisor, without 
the employer's knowledge. The employer/owner was certainly justified in terminating Ms. 
Mason when these facts were discovered. 
Under Utah law, an employment relationship entered into for an indefinite period of 
time is presumed to be at-will and gives rise to a contractual arrangement where the 
employer or the employee may terminate the employment for any reason, except as provided 
by law. See Ryan v. Dans Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 400 (Utah 1998); Fox v. MCI 
Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 
P.2d 49, 53-55 (Utah 1991); Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979). 
Termination for just cause is widely understood to permit discharge only for "a fair and 
honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith . . . as opposed to one that is trivial, 
capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual." Uintah Basin Medical 
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Center v. Hardy, 2005 UT App 92,110 P.3d 168, 174 (Utah 2005) (citing Guz v. Bechtel 
Nat'l, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317,100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089,1100 (2000) (quotations and 
citation omitted)). This broad definition of just cause allows an employer to discharge an 
employee not only for misconduct or poor performance but also for other legitimate 
economic reasons. Id. Courts have recognized that "c[i]n deciding whether [just] cause 
exists, there must be a balance between the employer's interest in operating its business 
efficiently and profitably and the employee's interest in continued employment. . . . Care 
must be exercised so as not to interfere with the employer's legitimate exercise of managerial 
discretion.'" Id. (citing Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Infl, Inc., 17 Cal.4th 93, 69 
Cal.Rptr.2d 900, 948 P.2d 412, 417 (1998) (citations omitted); see also 82 Am.Jur.2d 
Wrongful Discharge § 181 ("What constitutes good cause for dismissal of an employee is 
generally a matter for an employer's good business judgment. . . .")). 
In Utah, like other courts around the country, courts have adopted a balanced 
approach that requires an employer to justify termination with an objective good faith reason 
supported by facts reasonably believed to be true by the employer. Id. (citing Tow son Univ. 
v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 862 A.2d 941, 950-51, 954 (2004) ("[I]n the just cause employment 
context, a jury's role is to determine the objective reasonableness of the employer's decision 
to discharge, which means that the employer act in objective good faith and base its decision 
on a reasoned conclusion and facts reasonably believed to be true by the employer." 
(emphasis omitted))). These courts recognize that an employer's justification for discharging 
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an employee should not be taken at face value but also recognize that a judge or jury should 
not be called upon to second-guess an employer's business decisions. See e.g., Cotran v. 
Rollins Hudig HallInt'l, Inc., 17 Cal.4th 93, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 900,948 P.2d412,417 (1998) 
('"Although the jury must assess the legitimacy of the employer's decision to discharge, it 
should not be thrust into a managerial role.'" (citation and emphasis omitted)). This, of 
course, is what the ALJ did in this instance. He took away Mr. Timmons' (the owner of Salt 
Lake Harley Davidson and the employer of Ms. Mason) right to be the manager of his own 
business. The ALJ required that unemployment benefits be awarded an employee who 
directly disobeyed her promise and then used cunning deceitful methods to cover that 
disobedience up. That is wrong. It was wrong because the employee's method of securing 
"approval" was in itself deceitful and an act of insubordination. The ALJ is establishing a 
standard that rewards cunning and deceit. 
"An individual is ineligible for unemployment benefits when he or she is discharged 
for cjust cause.'" Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(2)(a) (2001). Rule 994-405-202 of the Utah 
Administrative Rules requires three elements be satisfied to establish just cause for 
termination: (1) culpability, (2) knowledge, and (3) control. Utah Admin. Code 994-405-
202 (2005). All three elements are satisfied for both causes of termination. 
A. Ms. Mason is Culpable. 
The employee is definitely culpable. Rule 994-405-202(1) states in pertinent part: 
"The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If 
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the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no 
expectation that it would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be 
shown. The claimant's prior work record is an important factor in determining 
whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good faith error in 
judgment." 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-202(1) (2005). 
Argument was made by Ms. Mason in the hearing below that culpability could not 
be found because she allegedly got permission from a supervisor to have a fellow employee 
clock her in on a day she was not at work, notwithstanding the testimony from the supervisor 
to the contrary. See Transcript p. 23, In. 1-21. Rule 994-405-208(l)(d) states that 
"[cjulpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of itself, cause 
harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the employer's ability to 
maintain necessary discipline." Utah Admin. Code 994-405-208(1) (2005). There can be 
no question that an employee who does not clock in and out as instructed to, and then has 
other employees clock her in when she is not even at work, diminishes the employer's ability 
to maintain necessary discipline and jeopardizes the employer's rightful interests. 
Culpability is clear. 
Furthermore, this was not an isolated incident, the employee had repeatedly been 
warned to change this behavior. It was behavior of such an offensive nature and of such 
concern to the employer that the employer sought for and obtained from the employee a 
promise to never let it happen again. Therefore, there is no question that the behavior was 
"continued or repeated" by the employee. The first element should unquestionably be met. 
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B. Ms. Mason Had the Requisite Knowledge. 
The employee also had the required knowledge. The employer had made repeated 
requests and warnings to the employee to clock in and out correctly. This fact was 
referenced by the lower Court in it's decision. She should have "been able to anticipate the 
negative effect of [her] conduct." See Utah Admin. Code 994-405-202(2) (2005). Ms. 
Mason testified during the hearing that she understood that it was a problem for her to 
continue to fail to clock in and out correctly and that both the employer and the supervisor 
had instructed her that it was their expectation that she correct that behavior. See Transcript 
p. 34, In. 22-42. Additionally, Mr. Hill (another employee), the supervisor, and Mr. 
Timmons (the owner/employer) all testified that those conversations had taken place and that 
Ms. Mason knew of their expectations in that regard. See Transcript p 13, In. 20-31; p. 24, 
In. 19-36; p. 30, In. 1-2. Each of them testified that Ms. Mason was repeatedly verbally 
warned that she needed to clock in. When she failed to do so, and had another employee 
clock her in on a day when she was not even working, she was terminated. That culminating 
event, however, was after a long track record of failing repeatedly to conform to the 
requirements for employment. The employer gave a clear explanation of the expected 
behavior, warnings had been given, and she had been given opportunity to correct the 
objectionable behavior. Further, she had promised to correct the behavior. The fact that she 
made this promise is ample evidence that she had knowledge of the behavior which needed 
correcting. This satisfies the knowledge requirements. 
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C. Ms. Mason Had Control of Her Decisions. 
The employee's conduct was also within her control, the third requirement for a just 
cause termination. See Utah Admin. Code 994-405-202(3) (2005). It would have been a 
much simpler solution for the employee to approach the employer and acknowledge that she 
did not clock in at the right time on July 21, 2003, and have the payroll system changed to 
reflect that mistake. Instead, she deliberately went behind the employer's back to make other 
arrangements she already knew would be unacceptable to the employer. The employee had 
been warned, and she knew it was her responsibility to clock in and out at the appropriate 
times. She was the one who elected to not perform as she had promised. Her conduct was 
within her control. She failed to do as she promised and was therefore terminated for just 
cause. 
It was Ms. Mason's duty to clock in and out. Not anyone else's. It was she that was 
required to clock in and out upon entering and leaving work. It was she that had been told 
on a number of occasions that she should fix her behavior. Violating that responsibility, and 
enlisting other employees to help her with those violations spreads the insubordination and 
chaos. She arranged with a fellow employee to clock her in when she was not there. That 
tells the fellow employee that the employer's policies can be violated. Further, she had 
promised her employer that she would never do it again, and then did it again. Culpability, 
knowledge, and control are all met and there was just cause for her termination. 
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II. Having Met All Requirements, Ms. Mason Was Terminated With Just 
Cause, and Benefits Should Be Denied. 
The Board of Appeals referred to the general definition of discharge as set forth in 
Rule 994-405-201 of the Utah Administrative Code in their decision awarded 
unemployment benefits. That definition states: 
"A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in 
determining the date the employment ended. Benefits shall be denied if the 
claimant was discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in connection 
with employment, not constituting a crime, which was deliberate, willful, or 
wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest. However, not every 
legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial of benefits. A just cause 
discharge must include some fault on the part of the worker. A reduction of 
force is considered a discharge without just cause at the convenience of the 
employer." 
Utah Admin. Code 994-405-201 (2005). 
As demonstrated above, all the elements were met for just cause termination. The 
employer was therefore entitled to discharge the employee, and pursuant to the very 
definition of discharge, "[bjenefits shall be denied if the claimant was discharged for just 
cause[.]" There was fault on the part of the employee. The employee had been warned, she 
knew she was required to clock in and out appropriately. She knew that the employer would 
not approve of her being clocked in while she was not at work. She also knew she had 
broken her promises to clock in upon her arrival at work. So, she avoided her employer, the 
owner of the business, and spoke only to the wife of the owner in an apparent attempt to 
circumvent her promise. This was calculated to avoid facing the consequences she knew 
would happen should she approach the employer. There exists just cause for her discharge 
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and therefore no benefits should be awarded for employee nor charges awarded against the 
employer. 
The ALJ, in allowing Ms. Mason to recover unemployment benefits, in essence, has 
created a new rule of law. That rule allows an employee to directly disobey an employer, 
so long as she gets authority from another superior. In this case, it is even more egregious. 
Mr. Timmons, the owner of the business and Ms. Mason's employer is the party to whom 
Ms. Mason made her promise. Ms. Mason went to another supervisor, who in this case was 
below the employer in the chain of authority, and above Ms. Mason on that chain, in order 
to obtain permission to break that promise. That person, while Ms. Mason's superior, still 
necessarily took her direction from Mr. Timmons, the owner. That person had no 
knowledge of the promise Ms. Mason had made to Mr. Timmons, nor was she ever apprised 
of that promise. In essence the ALJ directly condones and rewards devious, dishonest, and 
cunning behavior by employees. It creates a rule of law that destroys an employer's 
autonomy to make their own decisions. It is wrong and creates a precedent that Utah 
employers should not be required to deal with. The ALJ has gone too far. 
It is further important to recognize that the termination of Ms. Mason's employment 
was not solely based upon this one incident. Mr. Hill testified during the hearing below that 
the decision to terminate Ms. Mason's employment was based upon the accumulating 
sequence of events in which she alone was distinguished as failing to follow direction for 
employees. See Transcript p. 11, In. 20-33. 
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Although the ufinal straw" alone is sufficient grounds for just cause termination, there 
were also other reasons, including direct insubordination, dishonesty, and continual failure 
to follow the admonitions of her employer. She even violated a direct "promise" to stop 
these actions. Her actions were deliberate, and dishonest. She was terminated with just 
cause and she should be denied any unemployment benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Petitioner respectfully requests this 
Court overrule the award of unemployment benefits made in Respondent's favor. Having 
just cause for her termination, she should justly be denied any benefits resulting from her 
dishonest behavior. 
DATED this \ \ day of September, 2005. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
/Deny^./SMffer, Jr. 
tforneylfDr Petitioner 
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I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage prepaid, 
on the following: 
Richard M. Hymas 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
POBox 11808 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0808 
Tracy Vincent 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
140 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 45244 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244 
a 
on this \ I day of September, 2005. 
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APPENDIX 
1. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208 (2005). 
R994-405-208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge. 
In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in 
determining eligibility for benefits. 
(1) Violation of Company Rules. 
If an individual violates a reasonable employment mle and the three elements of culpability, 
knowledge and control are satisfied, benefits shall be denied. 
(a) An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that further 
legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public policy or that 
infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may not be 
reasonable. If a worker believes a rule is unreasonable, the worker generally has the 
responsibility to discuss these concerns with the employer before engaging in conduct 
contrary to the rule, thereby giving the employer an opportunity to address those 
concerns. When rules are changed, the employer must provide appropriate notice and 
afford workers a reasonable opportunity to comply. 
(b) If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment contract or 
collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established if the discharge 
is consistent with the provisions of the contract. 
(c) Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were 
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However, if a 
worker was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further violations 
may result in a denial of benefits. 
(d) Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of itself, 
cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the employer's 
ability to maintain necessary discipline. 
(e) Serious violations of universal standards of conduct may not require prior 
warning to support a disqualification. 
(2) Attendance Violations. 
(a) Attendance standards are usually necessary to maintain order, control, and 
productivity. It is the responsibility of a worker to be punctual and remain at work 
within the reasonable requirements of the employer. A discharge for unjustified 
absence or tardiness is disqualifying if the worker knew enforced attendance rules 
were being violated. A discharge for an attendance violation beyond the control of 
the worker is generally not disqualifying unless the worker could reasonably have 
given notice or obtained permission consistent with the employer's rules, but failed 
to do so. 
(b) In cases of discharge for violations of attendance standards, the worker's recent 
attendance history must be reviewed to determine if the violation is an isolated 
incident, or if it demonstrates a pattern of unjustified absence within the worker's 
control. The flagrant misuse of attendance privileges may result in a denial of 
benefits even if the last incident is beyond the worker's control. 
(3) Falsification of Work Record. 
The duty of honesty is inherent in any employment relationship. An employee or potential 
employee has an obligation to truthfully answer material questions posed by the employer 
or potential employer. For purposes of this subsection, material questions are those that may 
expose the employer to possible loss, damage or litigation if answered falsely. If false 
statements were made as part of the application process, benefits may be denied even if the 
claimant would not have been hired if all questions were answered truthfully. 
(4) Insubordination. 
An employer generally has the right to expect lines of authority will be followed; reasonable 
instructions, given in a civil manner, will be obeyed; supervisors will be respected and their 
authority will not be undermined. In determining when insubordination becomes 
disqualifying conduct, a disregard of the employer's rightful and legitimate interests is of 
major importance. Protesting or expressing general dissatisfaction without an overt act is not 
a disregard of the employer's interests. However, provocative remarks to a superior or vulgar 
or profane language in response to a civil request may constitute insubordination if it 
disrupts routine, undermines authority or impairs efficiency. Mere incompatibility or 
emphatic insistence or discussion by a worker, acting in good faith, is not disqualifying 
conduct. 
(5) Loss of License. 
If the discharge is due to the loss of a required license and the claimant had control over the 
circumstances that resulted in the loss, the conduct is generally disqualifying. Harm is 
established as the employer would generally be exposed to an unacceptable degree of risk 
by allowing an employee to continue to work without a required license. In the example of 
a lost driving privilege due to driving under the influence (DUI), knowledge is established 
as it is understood by members of the driving public that driving under the influence of 
alcohol is a violation of the law and may be punishable by the loss of driving privileges. 
Control is established as the claimant made a decision to risk the loss of his or her license 
by failing to make other arrangements for transportation. 
(6) Incarceration. 
When an individual engages in illegal activities, it must be recognized that the possibility 
of arrest and detention for some period of time, exists. It is foreseeable that incarceration will 
result in absence from work and possible loss of employment. Generally, a discharge for 
failure to report to work because of incarceration due to proven or admitted criminal 
conduct, is disqualifying. 
(7) Abuse of Drugs and Alcohol. 
(a) The Legislature, under the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, Section 34-38-1 
et seq., has determined the illegal use of drugs and abuse of alcohol creates an unsafe 
and unproductive workplace. In balancing the interests of employees, employers and 
the general welfare, the Legislature has determined the fair and equitable testing for 
drug and alcohol use is a reasonable employment policy. 
(b) An employer can establish a prima facie case of ineligibility for benefits under the 
Employment Security Act based on testing conducted under the Drug and Alcohol 
Testing Act by providing the following information: 
(i) A written policy on drug or alcohol testing consistent with the requirements 
of the Drug and Alcohol Testing Act and which was in place at the time the 
violation occurred. 
(ii) Reasonable proof and description of the method for communicating the 
policy to all employees, including a statement that violation of the policy may 
result in discharge. 
(iii) Proof of testing procedures used which would include: 
(A) Documentation of sample collection, storage and transportation 
procedures. 
(B) Documentation that the results of any screening test for drugs and 
alcohol were verified or confirmed by reliable testing methods. 
(C) A copy of the verified or confirmed positive drug or alcohol test 
report. 
(c) The above documentation shall be admissible as competent evidence under 
various exceptions to the hearsay rule, including Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence respecting "records of regularly conducted activity," unless determined 
otherwise by a court of law. 
(d) A positive alcohol test result shall be considered disqualifying if it shows a blood 
or breath alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or greater per 100 milliliters of blood 
or 210 liters of breath. A blood or breath alcohol concentration of less than 0.08 
grams may also be disqualifying if the claimant worked in an occupation governed 
by a state or federal law that allowed or required discharge at a lower standard. 
(e) Proof of a verified or confirmed positive drug or alcohol test result or refusal to 
provide a proper test sample is a violation of a reasonable employer rule. The 
claimant may be disqualified from the receipt of benefits if his separation was 
consistent with the employer's written drug and alcohol policy. 
(f) In addition to the drug and alcohol testing provisions above, ineligibility for 
benefits under the Employment Security Act may be established through the 
introduction of other competent evidence. 
